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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Under the federal Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 
et seq., states participating in Medicaid and implementing a 
managed care environment are obligated to make, at least 
every fourth month, supplemental payments (known as 
―wraparound payments‖) to federally-qualified health centers 
(―FQHCs‖) in an amount equal to the difference between a 
predetermined rate set by the Medicaid statute multiplied by 
the number of Medicaid patient encounters, and the amount 
paid to FQHCs by managed care organizations (―MCOs‖)1 for 
all Medicaid-covered patient encounters.  In 2011, concerned 
that gaps in the FQHCs‘ claim verification process led to 
significant overpayments, the New Jersey Department of 
Human Services (the ―State‖) changed its methodology for 
calculating wraparound payments. Under the new 
methodology, instead of basing the payments solely on the 
                                                 
1
 MCOs are commonly referred to as health maintenance 
organizations or ―HMOs‖. 
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number of Medicaid encounters and their total MCO receipts 
as self-reported by FQHCs, the State would instead rely on 
data reported by MCOs absent receipt of certain additional 
data from the FQHCs.  Because MCOs only report encounters 
that they have approved and paid, prior MCO payment would 
become a prerequisite to State wraparound reimbursement 
under the new system.   
   
 Plaintiff, the New Jersey Primary Care Association 
(―NJPCA‖), a nonprofit organization under § 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code and comprised of New Jersey FQHCs, 
brought the instant action claiming that this change violated 
the FQHCs‘ right to due process and federal and state law 
governing Medicaid wraparound payments, resulting in 
considerable budget shortfalls.  The State moved for summary 
judgment; NJPCA cross-moved for summary judgment and 
moved for a preliminary injunction demanding the immediate 
payment of the amount the State would have paid under the 
preexisting system and enjoining the State from implementing 
the change.  The District Court granted NJPCA‘s motions for 
summary judgment and a preliminary injunction, and denied 
the State‘s motion.  The State now appeals.  We will affirm in 
part, and reverse in part.   
  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory Framework 
  Title XIX of the Social Security Act authorizes federal 
grants to states for medical assistance to qualified low-income 
persons.  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).  The 
Medicaid program is jointly financed by federal and state 
governments but is administered entirely by the states.  States 
that elect to participate in the program must comply with the 
federal Medicaid statute and implementing regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(―HHS‖).  Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 
533 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc). Among the federal requirements 
is the requirement that the state adopt an implementation 
―plan‖ approved by the federal government, consisting of a 
―comprehensive written statement submitted by the [state] 
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agency describing the nature and scope of its Medicaid 
program.‖  42 C.F.R. § 430.10; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396.  
The federal government will review the proposal and 
―determine whether the plan can be approved to serve as a 
basis for Federal financial participation . . . in the State 
program.‖  42 C.F.R. § 430.10.  State plans must be amended 
whenever necessary to reflect changes in the federal law or 
―[m]aterial changes in State law, organization, or policy, or in 
the State‘s operation of the Medicaid program.‖  Id.  § 
430.12(c)(ii).   
     
 States participating in Medicaid must also offer non-
profit federally-qualified health centers—the FQHCs—known 
as community health centers, which receive federal grants 
under Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act (―PHSA‖) 
and provide primary and preventive care to medically 
underserved communities.  42 U.S.C. § 254b.  Where 
available, such as for Medicaid-eligible encounters, FQHCs 
must seek reimbursement for their expenses.  Id. § 
254b(k)(3)(F).  The federal Medicaid statute specifically 
regulates FQHC reimbursement for services provided to 
Medicaid beneficiaries.  Id. § 1396a(bb)(1).  Under the 
Medicaid program, reimbursement payments owed by each 
participating state to FQHCs are assessed through what is 
known as the Prospective Payment System (―PPS‖).  Id. § 
1396a(bb)(1)-(3).  Stated simply, the FQHCs‘ reimbursement 
from the state is calculated by multiplying the number of 
Medicaid encounters by the average reasonable costs of 
serving Medicaid patients in 1999 and 2000 (the ―PPS rate‖), 
adjusted yearly for inflation by a factor known as the 
Medicare Economic Index.  Id.  The system creates risks of 
both under- and over-payment relative to actual costs.  If 
FQHCs control their costs below the PPS reimbursement, they 
stand to earn a profit.  If costs exceed the PPS reimbursement, 
FQHCs suffer a loss.
 2
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 Until 2000, in order to ensure that federal grant awards 
under the PHSA did not subsidize benefits that should be paid 
by Medicaid, the federal Medicaid statute required that state 
Medicaid programs reimburse FQHCs for all reasonable 
costs incurred when providing services to Medicaid 
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 Like many other states, New Jersey has adopted a 
managed care program, pursuant to which it contracts with 
managed care organizations—the MCOs—that arrange for the 
delivery of health care services to individuals who enroll with 
them.  Because MCOs do not typically operate their own 
facilities, MCOs subcontract with providers, including 
FQHCs, to provide medical services.  In New Jersey, MCOs 
receive prospective payments from the State based on a fixed 
monthly fee per patient and the anticipated use of services 
(the ―capitation payment‖).  The MCOs, in turn, contract with 
FQHCs to provide medical services, and reimburse FQHCs 
for Medicaid-covered encounters out of their capitation funds.  
Though the costs are agreed upon, under the Medicaid statute, 
MCOs must make to FQHCs at least ―the level and amount of 
payment which the [MCO] would make for the services if the 
services were furnished by a provider which is not a 
[FQHC].‖ Id. § 1396b(m)(2)(A)(ix).   
   
 A frequent problem, and the subject of the dispute 
before us, occurs in a managed care system: the contracted-for 
payment from the MCO to the FQHC for a Medicaid-covered 
patient encounter is often less than the amount the FQHC is 
entitled to receive under the PPS.  In this situation, the 
Medicaid statute requires the state to make a supplemental 
payment—the wraparound payment—at least once every four 
months, to make up the difference between the PPS rate and 
the MCO payment.  § 1396a(bb)(5)(B).  This payment must 
be ―equal to the amount (if any) by which the [per-visit rate] 
exceeds the amount of the payments provided under the 
[managed care] contract.‖   42 U.S.C. §1396a(bb)(5)(A).  In 
essence, then: FQHCs are entitled to two discrete payments 
for Medicaid-covered encounters, the direct payment from the 
                                                                                                             
beneficiaries.  The Benefits Improvement and Protection Act 
of 2000 (―BIPA‖), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, 
repealed cost-based reimbursement and adopted the PPS, 
which created these cost-controlling incentives.  BIPA also 
alleviated the providers‘ burden of providing individual cost 
data.  After the enactment of BIPA, providers need report 
only the number of Medicaid-eligible visits and MCO 
receipts.   
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MCO, and the wraparound payment from the state to 
supplement the former.  The MCO payment plus the 
wraparound payment equals the PPS reimbursement.  
Critically here, the Medicaid statute does not mandate any 
particular methodology for calculating the wraparound 
payment, and different states have implemented different 
procedures.  Compare Three Lower Cntys. Cmty. Health 
Servs., Inc. v. Maryland, 498 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(describing Maryland‘s practice whereby the FQHCs file 
claims to MCOs, and MCOs validate and process the claims 
and report them to the state), with Ohio Admin. Code § 
5101:3-28-07 (wraparound payments are calculated based on 
claim data submitted to states directly by FQHCs).   
 
 The Medicaid statute also requires that states ―provide 
for procedures of prepayment and postpayment claims review, 
including review of appropriate data with respect to the 
recipient and provider of a service and the nature of the 
service for which payment is claimed, to ensure the proper 
and efficient payment of claims and management of the 
program.‖  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(37)(B).  The Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (―CMS‖), the federal agency 
responsible for overseeing the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs, issues the State Medicaid Manual, which interprets 
federal law and regulations to require ―supporting 
documentation [that] includes as a minimum the following: 
date of service, name of recipient, Medicaid identification 
number, name of provider agency and person providing the 
service, nature, extent, or units of service, and the place of 
service.‖  State Medicaid Manual § 2500.2, at 2-112, 
available at www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Paper-Based-Manuals-
Items/CMS021927.html. 
   
B. New Jersey Medicaid and Calculation of Wraparound 
Payments   
 
 Following implementation of the PPS in 2000, New 
Jersey amended its state plan to read as follows:  
 
After the final PPS encounter rates effective 
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January 1, 2001 and July 1, 2001 are calculated, 
a financial transaction will be processed for the 
difference between the interim and final PPS 
encounter rate for encounters provided to 
Medicaid managed care beneficiaries.  Once the 
PPS rates effective January 1, 2001 and July 1, 
2001 have been finalized, all subsequent 
quarterly wraparound payments will be 
reconciled at 100% of the PPS encounter rate.   
 
N.J. State Plan, attach. 4.19-B, at 9(c)(10-11).  Though the 
plan amendment was approved by CMS, it does not specify 
how the State is to verify eligible claims or calculate 
wraparound payments, leaving this instead to the New Jersey 
Medicaid statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4D-1, et seq., and 
subsequent regulations.   
   
 The New Jersey Medicaid statute requires providers to 
―maintain such individual records as are necessary to fully 
disclose the name of the recipient to whom the service was 
rendered, the date of the service rendered, the nature and 
extent of each such service rendered, and any additional 
information, as the department may require by regulation.‖  
N.J. Stat. Ann § 30:4D-12(d).   State regulations specify that 
health care providers agree to ―furnish information for . . . 
services as the program may request.‖ N.J. Admin. Code § 
10:49-9.8(b)(2).  The regulations also require FQHCs to 
―maintain an accounting system, which identifies costs in a 
manner that conforms to generally accepted accounting 
principles and maintain documentation to support all data.‖  
Id. § 10:66-1.5(d)(1)(x).  The State is authorized to ―conduct 
either on-site or desk audits of cost reports, including 
financial, statistical, and medical records,‖ id. § 10:66-
1.5(d)(1)(x)(4), and in connection with such, FQHCs are 
required to ―submit other information (statistics, cost and 
financial data) when deemed necessary by the Department.‖  
Id. § 10:66-1.5(d)(1)(x)(5).   
 
 The New Jersey regulations implementing the quarterly 
wraparound payment system provide more specific details 
regarding Medicaid reimbursement and FQHC reporting 
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requirements: 
  
[A]ll quarterly wrap-around reports shall be 
reconciled at 100 percent of the difference 
between the final rate and the managed care 
receipts received for services provided to 
Medicaid . . . managed care beneficiaries. In the 
event of an underpayment, the Division shall 
reimburse the provider 100 percent of the 
amount due. In the event of an overpayment, the 
provider shall reimburse the Division 100 
percent of the overpayment within 30 days of 
the due date of the Managed Care Wrap-around 
Report. 
 
Id. § 10:66-1.5(d)(1)(viii)(4).  FQHCs are required to submit 
two quarterly reports to the New Jersey Department of Human 
Services—one indicating the number of Medicaid-eligible 
encounters, id. at § 10:66-1.5(d)(1)(viii)(6), and another 
indicating ―[a]ll Medicaid . . .  managed care payments 
received by the FQHC for the quarter, including capitation, 
fee-for-service, supplemental or administration fund, and any 
other managed care payments,‖  id. at § 10:66-
1.5(d)(1)(viii)(7).  FQHCs report these Medicaid encounters 
and the MCO receipts on reports called the ―Medicaid 
Managed Care Encounter Detail Report‖ and the ―Medicaid 
Managed Care Receipts Report.‖  Id. at § 10:66-4, App‘x. E.  
These reports do not require a claim-by-claim breakdown of 
the data; rather, they require FQHCs only to report the 
aggregate quarterly encounters and aggregate MCO receipts.   
  
 Up until the third quarter of 2011, to calculate the 
quarterly wraparound payment, the State relied solely on the 
self-reported Medicaid Managed Care Encounter Detail and 
the Medicaid Managed Care Receipts reports.  Using the 
FQHCs‘ reports, the State would multiply the number of 
Medicaid encounters by the PPS rate, and then subtract from 
this figure aggregate MCO receipts.  In practice, this meant 
that each FQHC would report all Medicaid-covered 
encounters on the worksheet, regardless of whether an MCO 
actually paid its contracted portion of the particular encounter.  
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Therefore, for reported encounters left unpaid by an MCO, 
the wraparound payment for that encounter would constitute 
the full PPS rate (i.e., full PPS rate minus the zero payment by 
MCO is equal to the wraparound payment).   
     
C. New Jersey’s New Wraparound Payment System 
 In a letter dated April 6, 2004, the State invited FQHCs 
to participate in a dialogue in an effort to remedy its concern 
that wraparound calculations were resulting in overpayments 
to the FQHCs.  Over the next few years, the State conducted 
site visits and held quarterly meetings to discuss possible 
remedies.  At a meeting on February 9, 2005, the State 
indicated for the first time that it would prefer to use data 
submitted to it by MCOs to calculate wraparound payments.  
It was not disputed that there were important discrepancies 
between the MCO and FQHC data systems.  The State 
believed that the self-reported data resulted in substantial 
overpayment by the State for invalid Medicaid claims that had 
been correctly rejected by the MCOs.  The NJPCA maintained 
that using MCO data would result in substantial 
underpayment because claims are rejected by MCOs for 
reasons unrelated to their Medicaid eligibility, and insisted 
that FQHCs continue to play a role in the verification process.  
In 2008, the State proposed that FQHCs include in their 
quarterly wraparound reports claim-level data fields (such as 
the name of the patient, the provider, Medicaid ID number, 
the encounter date, etc.) to verify each claim.  NJPCA resisted 
this proposal and the State held off implementation.   
 
 In 2011, however, the State informed FQHCs that it 
had performed a review of the MCO Medicaid data and 
discovered that approximately 10% of claims submitted by 
FQHCs to MCOs had been denied but were never corrected 
and resubmitted for MCO reimbursement.  Because these 
claims were nevertheless submitted as Medicaid-covered 
encounters in the FQHCs‘ quarterly wraparound reports, the 
State‘s wraparound payment for these claims amounted to the 
full PPS rate.  According to the State, this indicated one of 
two problems: either (1) the rejected claims, if valid, should 
have been, but never were, paid by the MCOs at the 
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contracted rate (indicating that the State overpaid by the 
amount of the contracted rate), or (2) the claims were invalid, 
for a variety of reasons—such as lack of Medicaid eligibility, 
accidental duplicate claims, or fraud—and were not eligible 
for any State reimbursement (indicating that the State 
overpaid by the entire PPS rate).   
 
 In a May 5, 2011 letter addressed to each FQHC, the 
State informed the clinics that it had developed, through a 
third party, a detailed reporting system that captured FQHC 
claim data from MCOs called the ―Molina Medicaid 
Encounter System.‖  The State provided a disk to each FQHC 
with the Molina data and invited the FQHCs to point out and 
reconcile valid Medicaid encounters they believe were not 
reported by the Molina system.   
   
 In a letter dated June 9, 2011, the State ordered new 
data to be included in the FQHCs‘ quarterly reports beginning 
with the third quarter of 2011.  The letter required the 
following detailed data fields to support reimbursement 
claims for each Medicaid encounter: (1) recipient full name; 
(2) recipient Medicaid ID number; (3) name of the MCO; (4) 
MCO assigned ID number; (5) FQHC billing number; (6) date 
of service rendered; and (7) procedure code and modifiers.  
The State indicated that it would not process the wraparound 
payments until it received this claim-level verification data.  
Despite raising concerns about the feasibility of providing this 
data on such short notice and requesting at least a one-quarter 
delay before implementation, the FQHCs expressed their 
intent to comply.  The NJPCA, however, reiterated its 
position that the State was nevertheless responsible for 
making full and timely wraparound payments for all valid 
Medicaid encounters.   
   
 The State sent a letter to the FQHCs on September 12, 
2011 that launched the parties into the instant dispute.  The 
letter requested that FQHCs provide two additional data fields 
for each claimed Medicaid encounter: (1) the MCO payment 
amount, and (2) the MCO payment date (together, the ―MCO 
payment data‖).  The letter also stated that if the FQHCs were 
unable to produce this information by the close of the third 
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quarter, the State would calculate the quarterly wraparound 
payment using the MCO data generated by the Molina system.  
To the NJPCA, this request evinced an unprecedented change 
to the New Jersey State Medicaid reimbursement system.  
Rather than ensuring reimbursement for all Medicaid-covered 
encounters, regardless of whether the FQHC obtained MCO 
payment, the State would reimburse FQHCs only for 
encounters for which the MCO had paid its contracted 
portion.  The State has not retreated from this position, 
maintaining that an MCO‘s determination that a claim is valid 
and Medicaid-eligible is an essential prerequisite to the 
State‘s reimbursement.   
   
 The NJPCA objected to the change, principally on the 
ground that MCOs deny claims for myriad reasons unrelated 
to whether the encounter was covered under Medicaid.  For 
example, MCOs might reject valid Medicaid services when a 
patient sees a covering physician rather than the patient‘s 
primary care physician when the primary care physician is on 
vacation or ill, when a single physician provides services in 
two different locations on the same day, or when an MCO‘s 
own processing delays wrongfully result in a claim‘s ―late 
submission.‖  When an MCO denies a valid Medicaid-eligible 
claim for one of these reasons and the State refuses to pay any 
wraparound payment, the FQHC is denied the entire PPS rate 
reimbursement for a Medicaid-eligible encounter, which, 
NJPCA argues, constitutes a violation of the federal Medicaid 
statute‘s mandate that FQHCs receive full and timely 
compensation.   
 
 While objecting to the change in policy, the FQHCs 
nevertheless attempted to comply with the State‘s additional 
documentation demands by the end of the third quarter of 
2011.  After reviewing the claims data submitted, however, 
the State determined that each of the FQHCs had failed to 
submit sufficiently complete or accurate data.  According to 
the State, in some instances, FQHCs failed to provide the 
amount or date of the MCO payment; in others, FQHCs 
provided duplicate Medicaid numbers for multiple 
encounters.  Therefore, the State based its third-quarter 
wraparound payments on the Molina system.  The State made 
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these payments in late November 2011, which FQHCs claim 
resulted in severe budget shortfalls, including as much as 
$400,000 for one FQHC.
 3   
 
 The NJPCA brought the instant action on behalf of the 
New Jersey FQHCs, claiming that the State‘s new 
wraparound payment policy violated the federal Medicaid 
statute and the New Jersey‘s own Medicaid regulations.  The 
NJPCA also alleged that the State‘s implementation of the 
new policy without changing existing regulations through 
notice and comment rulemaking procedure violated its right to 
due process. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, 
and the NJPCA moved for a preliminary injunction requiring 
the emergency payment of wraparound funds based on the 
predecessor payment system.   
 
D. The District Court’s Decision 
 The District Court found, first, that the State‘s 
unilateral change in its wraparound payment policy 
constituted an amendment of the State plan without obtaining 
federal approval in violation of the federal Medicaid statute.  
The Court also found that the State‘s departure from its own 
regulations without notice-and-comment rulemaking was 
arbitrary and capricious.  The Court further found that the 
policy of requiring prior MCO payment for eligibility itself 
was arbitrary and capricious because prior MCO payment is 
not equivalent to eligibility for Medicaid, as MCOs deny 
claims for reasons unrelated to whether they are covered by 
Medicaid.  In other words, because some Medicaid-covered 
encounters would remain unpaid, the new policy would 
guarantee that the State would violate the Medicaid statute‘s 
mandate to reimburse FQHCs at the PPS rate.  Moreover, the 
Court found that the new policy constituted a denial of the 
FQHCs‘ right to procedural due process, because it deprived 
                                                 
3
 According to the State, several FQHCs submitted additional 
data validating Medicaid-covered encounters that had not 
been accounted for in the Molina data.  The State, after 
reviewing the new data, made additional supplemental 
payments to these FQHCs. 
  
13 
them of their property interest in full and complete 
wraparound payments without adequate notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.  Finally, the Court found that the FQHCs would 
be denied due process under the new policy, because they 
would be unable to meaningfully challenge wraparound 
payment denials other than through the private—and 
inadequate—MCO appeals process.   
 
 Accordingly, the District Court entered an order 
granting NJPCA‘s motion for summary judgment and denying 
the State‘s motion, and issued a preliminary injunction,  
enjoining the State from calculating wraparound payments in 
the manner proposed and ordering immediate emergency 
payment in the amount the FQHCs would have received under 
the preceding wraparound payment system.  While the Court 
acknowledged that NJPCA had established its entitlement to 
summary judgment on the issue of whether the State‘s past 
actions violated the law, it noted ―complex issues of fact 
relevant to the establishment of a new system, which are 
unsuited to resolution by the Court.‖  A22 (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, the Court exercised its equitable powers to grant 
―limited injunctive relief‖ relating to remediating the State‘s 
past illegal actions, and retained jurisdiction over the case 
while the parties ―engaged in a good-faith effort to resolve 
their differences and create a new system that complies with 
federal and state law.‖  Id.  The Court required that the State 
submit an implementation plan within 180 days of the order 
and that the parties submit regular written status reports.  The 
State now appeals.   
   
 II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
review of a district court‘s grant of summary judgment is 
plenary, and we view the facts in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party.  A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 
F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).  We review a district court‘s 
decision to grant a preliminary injunction under a three-part 
standard: findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, 
conclusions of law are evaluated under a plenary standard, 
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and the ultimate decision to grant the preliminary injunction is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  Rogers v. Corbett, 468 F.3d 
188, 192 (3d Cir. 2006).   
   
III. ANALYSIS 
 As an initial matter, the parties agree on appeal, 
notwithstanding the order of the District Court to the contrary, 
that the State may require that FQHCs provide claim-level 
data of the seven categories initially requested in the June 9, 
2011 letter: (1) recipient full name; (2) recipient Medicaid ID 
number; (3) name of the MCO; (4) MCO assigned ID 
number; (5) FQHC billing number; (6) date of service 
rendered; and (7) the procedure code and modifiers.  
Appellee‘s Br. at 24.  Indeed, the State was well within its 
statutory and regulatory authority to require this information, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(37)(B) (requiring that states collect 
such information); N.J. Stat. Ann §§ 30:4D-12(d), (f) 
(authorizing agency to collect this data), and we will reverse 
the order of the District Court to the extent it enjoined the 
State from taking such action.   
  
 NJPCA does take aim, however, at the State‘s 
requirement that FQHCs submit the two MCO payment data 
fields—the MCO Payment Amount and the MCO Payment 
Date—before receiving quarterly wraparounds payments.  On 
appeal—and conceded during oral argument—the NJPCA 
objects not to the collection of the MCO payment data, as 
such, but only insofar as the collection of that data is ―really 
just indicia of a new policy limiting supplemental payment to 
only those encounters that received prior MCO payment.‖  
Appellee‘s Br. at 24; see also id. at 43 n. 12 (―The primary 
issue of contention in this case is the State unlawfully 
requiring prior MCO payment for an FQHC to obtain a 
corresponding supplemental payment.‖).  Therefore, because 
the NJPCA appears to have waived its objection to the data 
collection requirements, and for the additional reasons we 
discuss below, we will also reverse the order of the District 
Court to the extent it enjoined the State from requiring 
FQHCs to report the two MCO payment data fields.   
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 At the heart of the instant dispute is the NJPCA‘s 
attempt to invalidate the State‘s policy shift requiring prior 
MCO payment before processing wraparound 
reimbursements. The NJPCA contends that the State‘s action: 
(1) violated the federal Medicaid statute by (a) effectuating a 
de facto amendment to its State Medicaid Plan without 
obtaining prior federal agency approval in violation of 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a and 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c), and (b) failing to 
provide FQHCs with full and timely wraparound payments; 
(2) violated New Jersey regulations implementing Medicaid; 
and (3) violated the FQHCs‘ right to procedural due process 
by depriving them of wraparound payments without sufficient 
notice and opportunity to be heard.   
   
 The State, of course, has taken issue with each of these 
contentions.  We depart from the District Court on several of 
its grounds for invalidating the State‘s action, and will 
address these first.  At the end of the day, however, we 
conclude that the State‘s requirement of prior MCO payment 
before processing a wraparound reimbursement, absent an 
effective process by which FQHCs may challenge improperly 
denied claims within the statutorily mandated time period, 
violates the federal Medicaid statute‘s requirement that 
FQHCs receive full and timely wraparound payments.    
 
 A. New Jersey Regulations 
 The District Court found that the MCO payment 
documentation requirement and the prior payment 
requirement violated New Jersey‘s regulations implementing 
Medicaid, and ordered compliance with those regulations.  
We conclude that the Eleventh Amendment barred the Court 
from taking any such action.   
  
 The NJPCA characterizes its claim that the State 
violated its own implementing regulations as a violation of 
federal law.  A federal court, however, is ―barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment from ordering . . .  state officials to 
conform their conduct to state law.‖ Jones v. Connell, 833 
F.2d 503, 505 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Concourse 
Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. DeBuono, 179 F.3d 38, 
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43 (2d Cir. 1999) (―As we repeatedly have explained, the 
failure of a State authority to comply with State regulations 
cannot alone give rise to a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 cause of 
action.‖).  In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, the Supreme Court explained:   
 
A federal court‘s grant of relief against state 
officials on the basis of state law, whether 
prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate 
the supreme authority of federal law. On the 
contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater 
intrusion on state sovereignty than when a 
federal court instructs state officials on how to 
conform their conduct to state law. Such a result 
conflicts directly with the principles of 
federalism that underlie the Eleventh 
Amendment.  
 
465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984).      
 
 The Second Circuit applied this doctrine in the 
Medicaid context, when a health care provider claimed that 
New York‘s manner of conducting audits violated the New 
York plan and regulations, and, as such, violated the federal 
Medicaid statute.  Concourse Rehabilitation, 179 F.3d at 43-
44.  The Court concluded that ―absent the assertion of a 
specific conflict between the State plan or practices and 
federal law, such allegations fail to give rise to a federal cause 
of action.  Because Concourse's allegations fail to assert such 
a specific conflict, and because the Eleventh Amendment bars 
our consideration of purely State law claims, we lack 
jurisdiction to decide appellant‘s claim.‖  Id. at 44 (internal 
citation omitted).  Similarly here, the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction to invalidate the State‘s action on the basis of the 
State‘s purported failure to abide by its implementing 
regulations.   
   
B.  Due Process 
 We also disagree with the District Court that the 
State‘s change of policy violated the FQHCs‘ right to 
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procedural due process.  The NJPCA makes two distinct due 
process claims: (1) that the State‘s action itself deprived the 
FQHCs of due process because it denied them the full 
wraparound payments to which they were entitled without 
affording sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard; and 
(2) that the MCO appeals process is inadequate to protect 
against the deprivation of their entitlement to full 
supplemental payments.  The Court found that the FQHCs 
had succeeded on both of these claims, because (1) the policy 
change was not accompanied by a notice-and-comment rule-
making procedure and (2) the FQHCs‘ ―only recourse is the 
MCO appeals process—a private contractual remedy which 
may bear little relation to whether a disputed claim is eligible 
for Medicaid coverage.‖  A. 16.   
    
1. Notice and Opportunity to Heard 
 The State‘s failure to engage in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking does not constitute a procedural due process 
violation.  The Due Process Clause does not require a state 
agency to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking.  See 
Tenny v. Blagojevich, 659 F.3d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(―The plaintiffs suggest that some sort of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking might satisfy constitutional due process.  The 
prospect of a federal court ordering a state to create such a 
procedure risks turning procedural due process into a 
constitutionally mandated state administrative procedure 
act.‖).  Indeed, the NJPCA does not try to defend this position 
before us.  Rather, it essentially argues that FQHCs were not 
given enough notice to comb through and reconcile the data 
demanded by the State in time for the end of the third quarter 
of 2011.  While sympathetic, we cannot see how this amounts 
to a deprivation of constitutional proportions.  The NJPCA 
also argues that the State failed to give notice ―justifying‖ the 
denial of full wraparound payments.  However, the State had 
given the FQHCs notice of its intent to seek and base its 
wraparound reimbursement on MCO payment data as early as 
2004 and solicited FQHCs‘ opinions on the issue on multiple 
occasions.  The State‘s action did not amount to a due process 
violation.   
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2. MCO Appeals Process 
 The second due process claim is more perplexing as it 
seems to involve the adequacy of the process provided by 
non-state actors, the MCOs.  This cannot rise to a 
constitutional violation. See Gonzalez-Maldonado v. MMM 
Healthcare, Inc., 693 F.3d 244, 248 (1st Cir. 2012) (―Because 
we hold that [MCOs] are not governmental actors, the 
appellants‘ constitutional claims necessarily fail . . . .‖).  The 
NJPCA attempts to shoehorn the State into this claim by 
arguing that the new State policy leaves the FQHCs with no 
choice when confronted with a wrongful denial of a 
Medicaid-eligible claim but to go through the internal MCO 
appeals process, which the NJPCA contends is time-
consuming and biased.  But this simply restates the NJPCA‘s 
substantive Medicaid claim.  If an FQHC is entitled to a 
wraparound payment for a Medicaid-eligible claim 
notwithstanding the lack of the prior MCO payment, the 
State‘s refusal to provide the payment is unlawful—no matter 
what subsequent process is offered.  In any event, the 
adequacy or inadequacy of the internal MCO appellate 
process cannot be the basis for a procedural due process 
claim.   
 
C. Federal Medicaid Statute 
 The District Court found that the State‘s shift in policy 
violates the Medicaid statute in two ways: (1) it constitutes an 
amendment to the State Medicaid plan which requires federal 
approval, not the informal procedure used here; and (2) it 
deprives FQHCs of the full and timely wraparound payments 
to which they are entitled.  We find that FQHCs do not have a 
private right of action to enforce the federal Medicaid 
statute‘s state plan approval requirement, but agree that the 
State‘s action violates the statute‘s requirement that a state 
timely make fully compensatory wraparound payments.   
 
 1. Federal Approval Requirement 
 As noted, the State must amend its plan and submit it 
for federal approval by the CMS to reflect ―[m]aterial changes 
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in State law, organization, or policy, or in the State‘s 
operation of the Medicaid program.‖ 42 C.F.R. § 
430.12(c)(ii).  If the CMS determines that a state plan or plan 
amendment does not comply with statutory requirements, it 
may deny the state federal funds.  Id. §§ 430.15(c), 430.18.  
The District Court concluded that New Jersey‘s change in 
requiring the MCO data and prior MCO payment before 
processing wraparound payments constituted a de facto 
amendment to the plan without first securing federal approval 
in violation of the Medicaid statute.  42 U.S.C. § 1396a; 42 
C.F.R. § 430.12(c).  Because the FQHCs lack a private right 
of action to enforce the federal approval requirement—and 
NJPCA is comprised of New Jersey FQHCs—however, we do 
not address whether federal approval was required.   
   
 ―In order to seek redress through § 1983, . . .  a 
plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right not merely 
a violation of federal law.‖  Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 
329, 340 (1997).  To determine whether a particular statutory 
provision gives rise to federal right, we look to whether 
―Congress [1] must have intended that the provision in 
question benefit the plaintiff . . . [,] [2] the right assertedly 
protected by the statute is not so ‗vague and amorphous‘ that 
its enforcement would strain judicial competence . . . [,] [and] 
[3] the statute must unambiguously impose a binding 
obligation on the States.‖  Id. at 340-41.  The Court, in 
Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), emphasized 
that Congressional authorization of a private right of action 
must be clear: ―We now reject the notion that our cases permit 
anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support 
a cause of action brought under § 1983.‖  Id. at 283.   
     
 Even though the FQHCs would benefit from 
enforcement of the federal approval provision in this case, 
there is no indication that Congress intended the approval 
provision to confer a private right of action to health care 
providers.  Pa. Pharmacists Assoc. v. Houstoun,  283 F.3d 
531, 536 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc) (―It is important to keep in 
mind that the question whether a statute is intended to benefit 
particular plaintiffs is quite different from the question 
whether the statute in fact benefits those plaintiffs.‖).  
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Importantly, the provision contains no ―rights-creating 
language,‖ does not identify any discrete class of 
beneficiaries, and focuses primarily on the state as a regulated 
entity rather than any individuals.  See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 
287-90; Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 
F.3d 50, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2004).   
   
 We join several courts in reaching this conclusion.  
See, e.g., Developmental Servs. Network v. Douglas, 666 F.3d 
540, 546-48 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that even though state 
plan amendment was required under the Medicaid statute, this 
provision did not create a private right of action to health care 
providers because it was not intended to benefit them);  
Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 284-85 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that Medicaid recipients could not challenge a state‘s 
deviation from a plan which comports with federal law—the 
only enforceable right is a state plan that comports with 
federal requirements). Cmty. Health Care Assocs. of New 
York v. New York State Dep’t of Health, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 
No. 10–cv–08258 (ALC), 2013 WL 395449, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb 1, 2013) (finding that ―statutes and regulations requiring 
prior approval . . . do not indicate Congress‘s unambiguous 
intention to benefit FQHCs specifically. Thus, there is no 
basis for relief in a private suit. . . .‖); cf. Pa. Pharmacists 
Assoc., 283 F.3d at 541-42 (holding that health care providers 
suing for higher reimbursement rates lacked private right of 
action to enforce separate Medicaid provision requiring state 
plans to provide methods and procedures guaranteeing quality 
of care and adequate access).  Because FQHCs lack a private 
right of action to enforce the requirement of federal approval 
of state plan amendments, we lack jurisdiction to consider this 
claim.
4
   
                                                 
4
 In any event, we seriously doubt that the changes 
implemented by the State materially altered the terms of the 
federally-approved State plan.  New Jersey‘s plan is silent on 
the methodology for calculating wraparound payments or 
quarterly reporting requirements, leaving specific 
implementation to subsequent State regulation and 
interpretation.  See Tinoco v. Belshe, 916 F. Supp. 974, 982 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (―In such a complex area of the law, the 
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2. Full and Timely Wraparound Payment 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb)(5)   
 
 While the NJPCA‘s claim under § 1983 cannot be 
based on the State‘s failure to procure prior federal approval 
to a state plan amendment, it can be based on the fact that the 
State infringed the providers‘ right to full payment under the 
federal Medicaid statute.  See, e.g., Concilio de Salud Integral 
de Loiza, Inc. v. Perez-Perdomo, 551 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 
2008) (finding that whether the supplemental payment 
methodology is unlawful as applied is enforceable under § 
1983); Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford, 509 F.3d 204, 
209–12 (4th Cir. 2007) (same); Cmty. Health Ctr. v. Wilson–
Coker, 311 F.3d 132, 136, 140 (2d Cir. 2002) (same); see also 
West Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 21 (3d Cir. 
1989) (finding that rights-creating language of § 
1396a(a)(13)(A) creates private right of action for providers).   
   
 The NJPCA challenges the State‘s refusal to make 
wraparound payments on claims for which the MCO has not 
paid a FQHC, contending that the Medicaid statute requires 
the full wraparound payment for any Medicaid-eligible claim 
                                                                                                             
federal government expected states to formulate 
implementing regulations not described in the state plan.‖). In 
Concourse Rehabilitation & Nursing Center, Inc. v. DeBuono, 
the Second Circuit faced the issue of whether the New York 
State Department of Health‘s interpretation of its state plan 
departed so far from the terms of the plan that it ―constitute[d] 
a de facto amendment to the plan, requiring federal approval 
prior to implementation.‖  179 F.3d at 44.  Reasoning that the 
federal approval requirements could be triggered ―not simply 
by a change in the State‘s administration of the plan, but only 
by an alteration of the plan itself,‖ the Court held that a 
―State‘s interpretation of its own Medicaid plan cannot 
constitute a ‗change‘ as that term is used in [§] 430.12(c) . . . 
unless, at a minimum, the clear and unequivocal effect of the 
interpretation is actually to alter the written terms of the 
plan.‖  Id. at 46 (emphasis added).  Here, as in Concourse 
Rehabilitation, there has been no change to the New Jersey 
plan as written, only to its administration.   
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it submits to the State regardless of whether it has first 
received MCO payment.  The State, however, contends that it 
is not responsible for reimbursement at the PPS rate if the 
MCO has failed to make prior payment.  For the reasons that 
follow, we believe the answer is somewhere in between: 
Under the Medicaid statute, the State is, indeed, responsible 
for reimbursement of the entire PPS rate for all Medicaid-
eligible encounters.  The State may, of course, in determining 
whether a claim is Medicaid-eligible (i.e., whether it counts as 
an encounter), rely in its discretion on many sources, 
including data supplied by FQHCs, MCOs, or its own 
administrative process, and may refuse to pay non-Medicaid 
eligible claims.  Here, however, because the State concedes 
that the methodology it has chosen to verify claim validity—
the fact of prior MCO payment—will result in failures to fully 
reimburse FQHCs at the PPS rate for valid Medicaid claims, 
we conclude that the State‘s insistence on making wraparound 
payments contingent on prior MCO payment violates the 
federal Medicaid statute.   
   
 Starting with the text, the federal Medicaid statute 
requires ―payment to the [FQHC] by the State of a 
supplemental payment equal to the amount (if any) by which 
the amount determined [by multiplying the number of 
Medicaid encounters by the PPS rate] exceeds the amount of 
payments provided under the [MCO] contract.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(bb)(5)(A).  The State focuses on the word 
―supplemental,‖ which, it maintains, requires that the FQHCs 
receive payment from the MCOs first, and the State then 
supplement that payment in its periodic wraparound 
payments.  This places more weight on the word 
―supplemental‖ than it can possibly bear.  Nothing in the 
provision requires the sequence suggested by the State, but 
only that the payment be ―in addition to‖ the MCO contractual 
payment.  The provision sets forth a relatively simple 
equation: a state should make up the difference between the 
amount owed under the PPS rate for all eligible Medicaid 
encounters and the amount actually paid to the FQHCs by 
MCOs at least every four months.  See Cmty. Health Care 
Assocs., 2013 WL 395449, at *13 (holding that ―the phrase 
‗payments provided under the contract‘ permits deduction 
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only of amounts actually paid by the MCO to the FQHC‖).  
Where there is a valid Medicaid encounter for which an MCO 
has failed to make a payment, the supplemental payment 
equals the entire PPS rate.  See id. (―Whether or not the MCO 
makes a payment, the State is responsible for the 
supplemental payment (which may in fact be the entire PPS 
rate, if the MCO fails to make a payment).‖).  As the Fourth 
Circuit explained,   
  
the operative language of the statute for this 
case are the words ―equal to.‖  The 
supplemental payment must be ―equal to‖ the 
difference between the payment made by the 
managed care organization and the per-visit rate 
fixed by the Medicaid Act.  Thus the statute 
plainly provides that a State must make fully 
compensatory supplemental payments no less 
frequently than every four months. 
    
Three Lower Cntys.,  498 F.3d at 301 (4th Cir. 2007).  
 The conclusion we reach is bolstered by the history of 
the wraparound payment, which originally arose in the 
context of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (―BBA‖), Pub. L. 
No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251.  Section 4712 of the BBA removed 
the responsibility of MCOs to reimburse FQHC‘s at their 
cost-based rates as required under the predecessor statute.  
Rather, MCOs could agree on a contractual reimbursement 
rate as long as that rate was no less than the amount offered to 
a non-FQHC.  See id. § 4712 (then codified as amended as 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(C) (1999)).  The wraparound payment 
scheme was implemented to ensure, then, that even in 
managed-care states, FQHCs still received the full 
reimbursement amount to which they were entitled.  See 
Three Lower Cntys., 498 F.3d at 299 (―[E]ven when a State 
relies upon a managed care system to administer its Medicaid 
program, FQHCs are protected and must receive the full per-
visit rate calculated pursuant to the methodology outlined in 
the Medicaid Act.‖).   
   
 The primacy of making FQHCs whole every four 
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months resonates in the CMS‘s subsequent interpretation of 
the supplemental payment system.  In an interpretative letter 
to State Medicaid Directors,
5
 the CMS explained that the 
wraparound provision ―specifically requires States to make 
these supplemental payments. It is our conclusion that this 
requirement cannot and should not be delegated to an MCO, 
and that each State must determine any differences in 
payment and make up these amounts.‖  April 20, 1998, Health 
Care Financing Administration State Medicaid Director 
Letter, available at http://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-
guidance/federal-policy-guidance.html. The state, therefore, 
cannot simply shift its reimbursement obligations to MCOs.  
In another letter dated September 27, 2000  (as cost-based 
reimbursement was winding down), the CMS further clarified 
that full FQHC reimbursement for Medicaid-eligible 
encounters was paramount notwithstanding the risk of loss to 
the state.  In addressing what would occur in the event an 
MCO became insolvent, the letter concluded:   
  
In order to ensure that [FQHCs] are paid 
reasonable costs under the Act, the State is 
required to include, as part of supplemental 
payments, monies that [FQHCs] subcontracted 
to receive but did not receive from an insolvent 
MCO. . . . Ultimately, the State, on behalf of the 
[FQHC], is eligible to receive any settlement 
funds that the [FQHC] recovers through 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
                                                 
5
 Though the letter was issued when Medicaid still operated 
on a cost-reimbursement basis, not under the PPS, the analysis 
is the same.  The CMS‘s interpretative letters, ―like 
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency 
manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the 
force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.‖  
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).  
However, such interpretations are ―entitled to respect‖ under 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), ―to the extent 
that those interpretations have the power to persuade.‖  
Christensen, 429 U.S. at 587 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  
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September 27, 2000, Health Care Financing Administration 
State Medicaid Director Letter, available at 
http://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-guidance/federal-
policy-guidance.html.  In other words, when an MCO is 
unable to make its contracted-for payment due to insolvency, 
the state is required to pay FQHCs the full reimbursable 
amount (at the time, the FQHC‘s reasonable costs), and seek 
restitution itself.  Thus, while the statutory language is 
perhaps not as clear as one would wish, the tenor of the 
subsequent interpretations and the limited case law is clear: 
where MCOs do not pay out valid Medicaid claims, the 
FQHC should not be left holding the bag.  See Cmty. Health 
Care Assocs., 2013 WL 395449, at *13 (―There is no basis for 
the State‘s conclusion that the FQHC must accept the loss 
because the MCO denied payment for an otherwise legitimate 
visit.‖).  And, of course, the Medicaid statute does not support 
the State‘s contention that a wraparound payment must follow 
a prior MCO payment.  By opting into a managed care 
system, the State cannot avoid its responsibility to reimburse 
FQHCs at the full PPS amount.  Rather, Section 
1396a(bb)(5)(B) requires the State to ―pay FQHCs fully 
compensatory supplemental payments not less frequently than 
four months after [the State] has received the claim for 
supplemental payment.‖  Three Lower Cntys., 498 F.3d at 
303.   
   
 The State, however, makes a separate, and more 
compelling, argument justifying its reliance on requiring 
MCO payment prior to processing wraparound payments: the 
MCOs ―play an essential role in determining when a claim is 
for a ‗valid‘ and ‗Medicaid-eligible‘ encounter.‖  Reply Br. at 
11.  While the State must pay for all Medicaid-eligible claims, 
it must also determine which claims are Medicaid-eligible.  
Though the State has, since 2001, relied on the FQHCs self-
reported data to validate eligibility, nothing in the Medicaid 
statute requires the State to rely upon this data, or proscribes 
the State from turning elsewhere.
6
  As a district court recently 
                                                 
6
 We express no opinion as to whether New Jersey‘s own 
regulations require that the State rely solely on the quarterly 
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noted:    
 
[§ 1396a(bb)(5)] only require[s] that payment of 
the balance be paid by the State.  It does not 
require the [S]tate to determine if the payment is 
necessary in the first place.  That is, if payment 
is necessary, the [S]tate is responsible for it, but 
the statute is silent on the entity (be it the State 
or the MCO or the FQHC) which makes the 
threshold determination that payment is 
necessary.  
 
Cmty. Health Care Assocs., 2013 WL 395449, at *13.   
 Indeed, in Three Lower Counties, 498 F.3d at 305, the 
Fourth Circuit approved a system which relies on MCO 
processing to determine claim eligibility.  The Court 
described the Maryland wraparound system as follows:   
 
Once the [MCO] ensures that (1) a covered 
service (2) has been furnished (3) to an enrollee 
(4) by an approved provider, it processes the 
claim and pays the market rate for the patient 
visit. It then passes the claim information on to 
the Department of Health. The Department of 
Health itself then makes the determination 
whether a supplemental payment under § 
1396a(bb)(5) is necessary. . . .  [E]ven if the 
Department of Health did delegate to managed 
care organizations the responsibility of 
determining whether a supplemental payment is 
necessary, § 1396a(bb)(5) only requires that the 
state plan provide for the payment of a 
supplemental payment. It does not require that 
                                                                                                             
reports generated by the FQHCs to calculate wraparound 
payments, and as to whether the State must pass new 
regulations to effectuate a change in the calculation 
methodology.  As we have discussed earlier, the District 
Court lacked jurisdiction to conclude that State law imposed 
such requirements.   
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the state Medicaid agency itself make the 
determination whether a supplemental payment 
is necessary.  
 
Nothing prevents the State from shifting claim verification 
from the FQHCs to the MCOs, and, consistent with the 
federal Medicaid statute, states may rely on MCOs to 
determine whether a claim is Medicaid eligible.   
   
 This is not, however, what happened here.  Rather than 
leaving it to MCOs to determine whether or not a claim is 
Medicaid eligible, the State essentially adopted the fact of 
prior MCO payment as the proxy for Medicaid eligibility.  If 
MCOs denied claims from FQHCs only because they were 
not eligible for reimbursement under Medicaid or because 
they were otherwise invalid, this would satisfy the State‘s 
obligation.  The State concedes, however, that MCOs often 
deny payments for reasons unrelated to Medicaid, and we 
have already suggested some of these reasons—e.g., MCO 
delays, multiple visits in different locations in the same day, 
and visits with non-primary care physicians.   The new policy 
would, therefore, inevitably exclude valid, Medicaid-eligible 
encounters and result in underpayment.  Such a result would 
not comport with the Medicaid statute‘s requirement that 
FQHCs receive full and timely reimbursement under the PPS.  
See Three Lower Cntys., 498 F.3d at 303 (―In enacting § 
1396a(bb)(5), Congress addressed its concern that FQHCs be 
fully and promptly compensated for the services they render to 
Medicaid enrollees so that the FQHCs could perform their 
vital function in delivering healthcare to underserved 
populations. . . .‖).  On the record before us, we must 
conclude that requiring prior MCO payment before processing 
wraparound payments will result in the State‘s failure to meet 
this requirement.  In the absence of any process by which an 
FQHC may promptly and effectively challenge an adverse 
MCO determination within the statutorily mandated time 
period, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
enjoining the State from refusing to process wraparound 
payments for all claims lacking prior MCO payment.   
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 The State offers as an avenue of recourse to aggrieved 
FQHCs the administrative review process of N.J. Admin. 
Code § 10:49-10.3(a)(1), which permits a provider to request 
a hearing on any complaint arising out of the Medicaid claims 
process.  Of course, if the State‘s policy is to deny 
wraparound payment for any claim lacking prior MCO 
payment regardless of Medicaid eligibility, the administrative 
review process is of no value.  FQHCs must be able to 
meaningfully challenge adverse payment determinations and 
receive reimbursement from the State for valid, Medicaid-
eligible claims that have been denied reimbursement by 
MCOs.  See Cmty. Health Care Assoc., 2013 WL 395449, at 
*13 (―To the extent that there may be other reasons a valid 
claim would be denied by the MCO, [FQHCs] must be able to 
challenge these adverse payment determinations . . . .‖).  
Absent any such process,
 7
 the requirement of MCO payment 
prior to processing wraparound payments violates the 
Medicaid statute.
 8   
                                                 
7
 The MCO appeals mechanism does not appear to protect the 
interest of those FQHCs that received incorrect MCO 
determinations.  Not only does this process take considerable 
time to reach an ultimate determination, but it fails to address 
more basic concerns: What if the MCO continues to 
wrongfully reject a Medicaid-eligible claim?  Can an MCO‘s 
determination of claim validity end the inquiry?  
8
 Contrary to the State‘s claim, our conclusion does not create 
a substantial risk of double payment.  FQHCs remain under an 
obligation to seek MCO reimbursement for wrongfully denied 
claims, and the State is required to assist in this process.  If an 
FQHC later receives MCO reimbursement for a claim for 
which it has already received the full PPS wraparound 
amount, the State will be credited with this amount in a later 
reconciliation process.  See N.J. Admin. Code § 10:66-
1.5(d)(1)(viii)(4). 
 Ultimately, if the system is functioning correctly (i.e., 
in the absence of bad faith or fraud), the conclusion we reach 
should not shift resources one way or the other, only the 
timing.  Had we found, for example, that the State need not 
process a wraparound payment until a claim had been 
accepted and paid by an MCO, an FQHC, through the MCO 
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 We emphasize that we are affirming the order of the 
District Court granting summary judgment and a preliminary 
injunction in favor of the NJPCA only on the ground that the 
State‘s new policy of requiring prior MCO payment before 
processing its quarterly wraparound payments, absent a 
meaningful process to challenge adverse payment 
determinations, violates the federal Medicaid statute. In so 
doing, we do not mean to suggest that prior MCO payment is 
wholly unrelated to Medicaid eligibility.  Indeed, even if a 
state may not require an FQHC to bear the entire loss solely 
because of the MCO‘s lack of payment, it is far from 
irrational for the State to require MCO data on a quarterly 
basis as part of FQHC reporting, and to use such data when 
evaluating whether or not a claim is reimbursable under 
Medicaid.  In any event, as we have noted earlier in this 
Opinion, the NJPCA has not pressed before us its initial 
challenge to the collection of the two MCO payment data 
fields.
9
   
   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 We will affirm the order of the District Court granting 
summary judgment in favor of the NJPCA on the ground that 
the State‘s requirement that wraparound payments be 
contingent on prior MCO payment violated the federal 
                                                                                                             
appeals process (or with intervention by the State), would be 
able to eventually receive reimbursement for wrongfully 
denied claims.  Fundamentally at issue is which party must 
bear the cost of MCO errors or delays in reimbursement until 
these disputed claims can be reconciled.  The text of the 
statute and its legislative purpose, subsequent administrative 
interpretations, and the limited case law, all place a thumb on 
the scale in favor of prompt and complete State 
reimbursement.   
9
 Even if it had, however, we would have no difficulty 
concluding that the District Court erred when it found that 
requiring such data was ―arbitrary and capricious . . . because 
the new system itself fails to show a rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.‖  A. 15 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Medicaid statute‘s requirement that FQHCs timely receive 
full wraparound payment for all Medicaid-eligible claims 
(and, concomitantly, requiring the emergency payment of 
wraparound funds based on the State‘s predecessor 
methodology) and enjoining the State from implementing a 
policy requiring prior MCO payment absent an adequate 
process for claim-eligibility verification.  In all other respects, 
we will reverse the order of the District Court granting 
summary judgment and a preliminary injunction in favor of 
the NJPCA and denying the State‘s motion for summary 
judgment.   
 
 
 
